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Jeremiad or Weapon of Words?
THE POWER OF EMOTIVE LANGUAGE IN SUPREME
COURT DISSENTS
AM A N D A C . B R Y A N , Loyola University Chicago
E V E M . R I N G S M U T H , Oklahoma State University
ABSTRACT
Unable to directly control the policy articulated by the Supreme Court, dissenting justices are faced
with the challenge of ﬁnding alternative ways to pursue their policy goals. We argue that one strategy
available to them is to use their power over the language of a dissenting opinion to increase the media
attention paid to a case. Our results show that cases with negative dissents attract more media coverage,
which creates a variety of mechanisms through which a dissenter’s policy preferences could be realized,
such as inducing Congress to take action, inﬂuencing public debate on the issue, and provoking further
litigation. This ﬁnding ultimately suggests that dissenters, while disadvantaged, are not powerless to affect
legal policy.
INTRODUCTION
At the end of its 2014 term, the US Supreme Court issued, arguably, some of its most
salient decisions in a decade. In three consecutive announcement days, the Court re-
jected a challenge to President Obama’s cornerstone domestic policy achievement, the
Affordable Care Act ðACAÞ; afﬁrmed a constitutional right to same-sex marriage, legal-
izing it nationwide; and allowed a highly contested method of execution to continue
despite Eighth Amendment challenges. Given the political importance of all three of
these decisions, it is not surprising that the decisions were extensively covered by the
media. What is surprising, however, is the narrative that emerged from the coverage.
While the implications of the majority opinions were explored, it was the language of
the dissenting opinions, particularly Justice Scalia’s, that captured the nation’s attention.
An earlier version of this article was presented at the 2014 annual meeting of the Southern Political
Science Association, New Orleans. We thank Ryan Black for generously sharing his data, Justin
Wedeking for his assistance with LIWC, Doug Rice and Tom Clark for providing advice on the use of
their measure, and Marcus Hendershot, the editor, and the anonymous reviewers for feedback on this
project. Contact the corresponding author, Amanda C. Bryan, at abryan2@luc.edu.
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Using language that is rarely seen in legal writing, Justice Scalia referred to the majority’s
reasoning as “a threat to American democracy,” “½full of  silly extravagances,” “showy pro-
fundities,” and “largely self-defeating.” Getting even more press were the words Justice
Scalia seemed to invent for the occasion including “jiggery-pokery,” “pure applesauce,”
and most famously suggesting that the law commonly deemed “ObamaCare” ought to
be called “SCOTUScare” instead.
It was the unabashedly blunt tone of these dissents that dominated media coverage
in the weeks to follow. Indeed, in the 2 weeks after the Court’s decisions, a cursory Google
News search revealed more than 700 articles headlining the tone of Justice Scalia’s dis-
sent.1 Nearly every major news outlet including CNN, FoxNews, the New York Times,
Newsweek, and Politico all published articles listing the most quotable lines of Scalia’s
dissents, while largely ignoring the other dissents and occasionally even the majority
opinion. The Washington Post reported “Scalia burns the Supreme Court as a group of
‘unrepresentative’ elitists” ðGoldfarb 2015Þ, and the New York Daily News headlined that
“Scalia rips fellow justices in sarcastic dissent” ðFriedman 2015Þ. Prominent constitu-
tional law scholar Erwin Chemerinsky decried the possible impact Scalia’s “scathing” and
“mean” tone might have on the future generation of lawyers in an op-ed in the Los Angeles
Times entitled “Justice Scalia: Why He’s a Bad Inﬂuence” ðChemerinsky 2015Þ. Late-
night commentary shows likewise lost no time highlighting the dissents, with Jon Stew-
art, Stephen Colbert, and John Oliver all doing segments on Scalia’s writing style. The
popular comedy website Funny or Die even employed the band Coheed and Cambria
to perform an original song using lyrics created entirely from Scalia’s two dissents.
That Justice Scalia was able to dominate the national conversation on two cases he,
for all substantive purposes, lost provides a possible answer to the broader question of
why justices would choose to lash out in their dissenting opinions. Was Scalia’s unre-
strained writing style merely a jeremiad, meant as little more than catharsis, or was he
intentionally seeking to shape the conversation? Scalia’s actions illustrate that while dis-
senting justices on the Court are not able to set precedent, they nonetheless possess tac-
tics to further their policy goals.
One such tactic is to call attention to their alternative perspective on legal questions,
which may invigorate the actions of like-minded potential litigants, judges, and so forth
and ultimately inﬂuence legal policy over time. Indeed, previous work demonstrates that
Supreme Court cases that receive prominent media coverage signal future litigants that
a particular issue is salient and politically relevant and that the Court is interested in it,
which translates into a larger number of these types of cases on the docket ðBaird 2004Þ.
If dissenting opinion authors successfully increase the visibility of a case through the
language of their opinions, any information about strategies for achieving policy goals is
also transmitted more effectively.
1. The search was conducted on July 16, 2015, at 10:00 a.m. ðCSTÞ using the terms “Scalia
dissent” and the date range 6/25/15 to 7/9/15.
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Such a mechanism is challenging to initiate, though, since the bulk of the Court’s
decisions receive little or no media coverage. While a dissenting vote reveals some level of
conﬂict, one of the commonly understood components of “newsworthiness” ðe.g., Gans
1980; Straubhaar, LaRose, and Davenport 2009Þ, and corresponds to an increased like-
lihood of a case being covered by the media ðSill, Metzgar, and Rouse 2013Þ, dissenting
opinion authors may be able to further enhance the likelihood of attention to a case and
their views by selecting more negative, emotionally charged language for the dissent.
Such language, like that employed by Justice Scalia, highlights the conﬂict in the case
and does so in a more dramatic fashion that may be attractive to media. In contrast to
majority opinions, the content and language used to convey key arguments in a dis-
senting opinion are fully controlled by the opinion author since he does not need the
approval of colleagues. Do justices use this autonomy to pursue their policy goals through
the language of dissenting opinions? We believe they do. If our theory is correct, dissent-
ing opinion language should increase media coverage of a case.
The analysis below makes several important contributions. First, it improves our
understanding of the role dissenting opinions and their authors play in policy making.
The results indicate that rather than being powerless, justices in the minority are in a
position to inﬂuence future policy development on an issue through their use of negative
language in dissenting opinions. Second, we shed light on the ways in which dissenting
justices can make use of the signaling mechanism outlined by Baird ð2004Þ by which
outside actors receive information about which policy areas are politically salient and
which areas the Court is interested in pursuing. Finally, the results speak to the im-
portance of language in Supreme Court opinions and policy making more broadly. The
analysis suggests that dissenting opinion authors can single-handedly exert inﬂuence on
future litigation and ultimately policy in an area through the strategic use of negative,
emotionally charged language in their opinions. Though we do not test other applica-
tions here, the ﬁndings raise the possibility that policy makers’ rhetorical choices may have
other important consequences.
We proceed as follows. To investigate the possibility that media coverage of Court
decisions is in part driven by dissenting opinion language, we begin by reviewing the
literature and outlining our theoretical argument. Next, we examine whether negative,
emotionally charged dissents raise the proﬁle of a case, potentially highlighting a dis-
senting opinion as well. Speciﬁcally, we test whether dissenting justices inﬂuence the
likelihood a decision is covered in four major newspapers through the language they use
in their opinions. Finally, we discuss our results and their implications for intra-Court
dynamics and policy development.
INFLUENCING POLICY THROUGH DISSENTING OPINIONS
Despite losing the battle of the day and being unable to establish precedent, a dissent-
ing justice is not necessarily incapable of inﬂuencing legal policy. Dissenting opinions
question the conclusion of the majority opinion, arguing that an alternative resolution
to the case would be more appropriate ðBrennan 1986Þ. By formally recording an
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alternative interpretation, dissents can affect future development of the law over time
ðPeterson 1981; Wahlbeck, Spriggs, and Maltzman 1999Þ. More immediately, the Court’s
practice of circulating opinion drafts allows majority opinion authors the opportunity
to see, and respond to, the points made by these separate opinion authors. The iterative
opinion drafting process therefore places dissenters in a position to indirectly inﬂuence
the content and scope of the majority opinion ðPeterson 1981; Scalia 1994; Ginsburg
1995; Wahlbeck et al. 1999Þ. By highlighting internal disagreement, dissenters may
also contribute to a lack of clarity on the legal issue at hand ðPeterson 1981Þ, which may
weaken the manner in which the Court’s opinion is received ðWahlbeck et al. 1999Þ.
While the aforementioned methods of inﬂuencing legal policy through a dissent are
perhaps the most obvious, other strategies exist. Dissenting opinions are also an oppor-
tunity for justices to communicate with outside actors who may be able to aid the dis-
senter in achieving a more desirable policy in the future ðWahlbeck et al. 1999Þ. More
speciﬁcally, dissenting opinion authors can use their opinions to target potential litigants,
lower court judges, governmental actors, or the public. We suggest that the language dis-
senters use in their opinions can help garner more media coverage for a case, thereby
facilitating communication with outside actors and improving dissenters’ ability to have
an impact on policy development.
First, cues embedded in dissenting opinions may inﬂuence the implementation of
Court decisions by lower court judges and encourage like-minded potential litigants to
bring their cases forward ðPeterson 1981Þ. For example, Justice Brennan noted that “a
dissent is sometimes designed to furnish litigants and lower courts with practical guid-
ance” ð1986, 430Þ. Thus, dissenting opinions could be used as a vehicle for dissatisﬁed
justices to relay information to outside actors in the hope of catalyzing favorable policy
development in the long run. Baird’s ð2004Þ work provides empirical support for such
a signaling strategy. Though the Supreme Court cannot formally request a case be put
on its docket, she demonstrates that the Court is able to signal potential litigants regard-
ing the types of cases it would receive favorably through its decisions and that these sig-
nals translate into changes in the Court’s agenda. The Court, Baird argues, informs out-
side actors of its interests through cues in its decisions in salient cases. She ﬁnds that the
issues covered in cases featured on the front page of the New York Times are then in-
creasingly represented on the Court’s docket, which creates more opportunities for the
Court to continue to develop the law on this topic. Though Baird’s study does not
directly examine this possibility, dissenting justices especially have an incentive to use
such a mechanism to encourage potential litigants to bring new cases to the Court since
they were unable to establish a favorable policy in the current case.
One such example of this strategy being employed effectively was the Court’s con-
sideration of the constitutionality of a Georgia statute prohibiting consensual sodomy
in Bowers v. Hardwick ð1986Þ. The majority opinion’s endorsement of the statute pro-
duced negative, emotionally charged language in the dissenting opinions. For example,
early in his dissent, Justice Blackmun criticized the majority and its approach to the case
saying, “In its haste to reverse the Court of Appeals the Court relegates the actual statute
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being challenged to a footnote, and ignores the procedural posture of the case before it”
ð478 U.S. 186, 200 ½1986Þ. Blackmun ended his dissent by lamenting the negative ef-
fects of the Court’s decision and by taking the unusual action of explicitly hoping that
the majority’s decision would soon be overruled: “I can only hope that, the Court soon
will reconsider its analysis. Depriving individuals of the right to choose for themselves
how to conduct their intimate relationships poses a far greater threat to the values most
deeply rooted in our Nation’s history than tolerance of nonconformity could ever do”
ð213–14Þ.
Similarly, Justice Stevens’s dissent was biting in its criticism, saying that Georgia’s law
and its prosecutor “completely fail to provide the Court with any support for the con-
clusion that homosexual sodomy, simpliciter, is considered unacceptable conduct in that
State” ð220Þ. Though not in his lifetime, Justice Blackmun’s hopes were ultimately real-
ized when Bowers was overruled in Lawrence v. Texas ð2003Þ. The Court’s decision in
Lawrence explicitly expressed support for Justice Stevens’s analysis in Bowers and in other
places seemed to echo Blackmun’s sentiment. While examples such as this are rare, dis-
senters undoubtedly recognize that highlighting conﬂict leaves open the possibility that
one day the Court will reconsider.
Did the negative dissents contribute to the policy shift observed from Bowers to
Lawrence? As we observed in the ACA and same-sex marriage cases, press coverage of
the decision in Bowers seemed to respond to the negativity of the dissenting opinions,
highlighting not just the split among the justices but also the caustic nature of their
discord.2 These examples suggest that the media take notice of the tone and character
of the Court’s opinions, including the dissents; and when dissenting language is highly
negative, these features are deemed important to incorporate into coverage of the de-
cision. For our purposes, these examples of negative dissents attracting media attention
illustrate a mechanism by which dissenters can enhance their ability to signal outside
actors and, ultimately, inﬂuence policy.
Second, dissenting opinion authors may seek to induce governmental actors, such
as members of Congress, to take action in pursuit of an alternative policy. They can do
this in a number of ways including directly asking others to act. Previous work demon-
strates that a nontrivial number of both majority and separate opinions in statutory cases
explicitly invite Congress to override the Court’s decision and that Congress subse-
quently overrides decisions with such invitations at a higher rate than those without
ðHausegger and Baum 1999; see especially fn. 5Þ. Since the dissenters’ views did not
prevail in the current case, they have the strongest incentive to encourage Congress, the
president, or other governmental actors to pursue more favorable policy. Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg openly used this strategy in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.
2. For instance, a headline from the front page of the New York Times read, “High Court,
5–4, Says States Have the Right to Outlaw Private Homosexual Acts; Division Is Bitter” ðTaylor
1986Þ. The article further described Justice Blackmun’s dissent as “impassioned” and took special note
of several of his and Justice Stevens’s dissenting arguments.
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Disagreeing with the majority’s interpretation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, Ginsburg pointedly laid out her rationale in a dissent described as “passionate”
ðGreenhouse 2007Þ and “stinging” ðBarnes 2007Þ. The ﬁnal arrow in her quiver was
a direct call to Congress to remedy what she saw as a grave and unlawful injustice for
women, stating that “once again, the ball is in Congress’ court. As in 1991, the Legislature
may act to correct this Court’s parsimonious reading of Title VII” ð550 U.S. 618, 661
½2007Þ. Congress heeded her call, introducing legislation within days and ultimately
passing the Lily Ledbetter Fair Pay Act less than 3 years later ðGinsburg 2010Þ.
Clearly, an explicit invitation to override the Court’s decision is not a practical solution
to a dissenter’s woes in every case. Invitations to override are an extreme example of
dissenting justices communicating with other governmental actors to induce action more
favorable than that of the majority. However, the fact that such an extreme strategy can be
effective ðHausegger and Baum 1999Þ suggests that more tempered attempts at encour-
aging outside action could be successful as well. Further, we expect that the language used
by dissenters can raise the proﬁle of a case, as it appeared to in Ledbetter, allowing dis-
senting justices to use their control over the dissenting opinion to more effectively signal
these outside actors.
Third, dissents may be designed to contribute to the public debate on a given issue.
Lacking the ability to set precedent, dissenting opinions may be an opportunity for jus-
tices to formally rebut the majority’s reasoning in a manner that attracts the public eye
and therefore creates the possibility of inﬂuencing public opinion on or attentiveness to
an issue. In addition to simply relaying the Court’s decisions, media coverage often in-
cludes commentary and analysis of judicial opinions. Since dissenters’ arguments are
frequently included in such coverage, though admittedly with less prominence than in-
formation about the majority, it provides a mechanism through which the message of
a dissenting opinion can be infused into contemporary and future public debate on the
subject. While we cannot expect that dissents would carry the same persuasive poten-
tial as majority opinions ðe.g., Franklin and Kosaki 1989; Johnson and Martin 1998Þ,
they are likely in a position to contribute to public discourse on and attentiveness to
an issue ðe.g., Flemming, Bohte, and Wood 1997Þ. This may sow seeds that could
produce future policy that is more desirable to dissenters. We argue that dissenters can
best position themselves to attain media coverage and inclusion in public debate by
crafting negative, emotionally charged opinions.
Broadly, we suggest that dissenting justices may inﬂuence future policy development
by using their opinions to communicate with outside actors such as potential litigants,
lower court judges, governmental actors, or the public. We remain largely agnostic as
to the speciﬁc goals dissenting justices have in mind and the audience they are trying to
reach. Our argument hinges on the fact that no matter who the audience is, media at-
tention is an essential ﬁrst step if justices have any hope of long-term policy change.
Early media attention helps bolster awareness of the issue, creates a record of the im-
portance of the issue on which future actors can look back, and is often the only way
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most Supreme Court decisions are noticed beyond elite legal circles. If dissenting opin-
ion authors can inﬂuence media coverage of a case, they have a chance of transmitting
their message to outside actors. We argue that they can do this through the language in
their opinions.
INCREASING MEDIA COVERAGE OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
Scholars indicate that conﬂict and controversy are key determinants of “newsworthi-
ness” ðe.g., Gans 1980; Straubhaar et al. 2009Þ. Therefore, language highlighting the
disagreement and conﬂict present in the justices’ analysis of a case may make the case
more attractive to news outlets. Dissenters are naturally well positioned to accentuate
the conﬂict over the resolution of a case for two key reasons. First, the fundamental
role of a dissenting opinion is to formally disagree with the conclusion of the majority
ðBrennan 1986Þ. As such, the very act of dissenting inherently indicates discord among
the justices, which, under the conﬂict criterion of newsworthiness, can make a case
seem more deserving of media coverage.
Second, dissenting opinion authors do not need to win the votes of their colleagues.
Therefore, they have a great deal of discretion over the content of their separate opin-
ions, especially compared to that of majority opinion authors. Put simply, dissenters are
in a position to choose whatever language they like to convey their points. Thus, dis-
senters’ ability to use negative, emotionally charged language allows them to indepen-
dently inﬂuence the level of conﬂict associated with a case, thereby increasing the de-
cision’s perceived newsworthiness. Drawing media attention to a case offers dissatisﬁed
justices a mechanism through which they can transmit their message to outside actors.
Such a tactic provides minority justices an opportunity to inﬂuence future development
in the law by shaping the manner in which the current precedent is applied, to equip
potential litigants with information ðPeterson 1981; Brennan 1986; Baird 2004Þ, to
encourage other governmental actors ðe.g., CongressÞ to take action ðHausegger and
Baum 1999Þ, and to contribute to the debate on important legal issues ðe.g., Brennan
1986; Scalia 1994; Flemming et al. 1997Þ.
Importantly, the aforementioned mechanism requires that reporters take note of
and respond to negative dissenting opinion language in their coverage of Supreme Court
decisions. Two examples suggest that this is indeed what occurs. First, in Citizens United
v. FEC, Justice Stevens blatantly criticized the Court’s decision in his dissent saying,
“The ruling rests on several premises. Each of these claims is wrong” ð558 U.S. 310,
414–15 ½2010Þ. Further, Stevens lambasted the majority’s actions saying that “the
Court’s ruling threatens to undermine the integrity of elected institutions across the
Nation. The path it has taken to reach its outcome will, I fear, do damage to this in-
stitution” ð382Þ. The New York Times coverage of Citizens United featured point-by-
point responses from Justice Stevens to the majority. Clearly picking up on the negative
tone, the article described Stevens’s dissent as “passionate” and summarized it as arguing
that the majority had “committed a grave error” ðLiptak 2010Þ.
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Second, in Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Afﬁrmative Action, Justice Sotomayor
ardently rebutted the majority’s ﬁnding in favor of Michigan’s ban on afﬁrmative action
in the admissions process for its public colleges and universities. Sotomayor assailed her
colleagues’ position saying that “today, by permitting a majority of the voters in Michi-
gan to do what our Constitution forbids, the Court ends the debate over race-sensitive
admissions policies in Michigan in a manner that contravenes constitutional protections
long recognized in our precedents” ð134 S. Ct. 1623, 1654 ½2014Þ. She further expressed
her disappointment with the majority’s conclusions about the status of minorities in the
United States, saying that “the Court’s refusal to accept the stark reality that race matters is
regrettable” ð1676Þ. Again media coverage of the case included substantial components
of Justice Sotomayor’s dissent, calling it “the most passionate and most signiﬁcant dissent
of her career” ðLiptak 2014Þ and a “ﬁerce defense” of afﬁrmative action policy ðBarnes
2014Þ. In both of these examples, media coverage is attentive to and appears drawn to the
language and tone used by dissenters.
Previous work effectively demonstrates that media coverage is inﬂuenced by case
characteristics, such as issue area and participation by the solicitor general, and other
factors outside justices’ control ðe.g., Larson 1985; Slotnick and Segal 1998Þ. However,
recent work suggests that additional factors related to intra-Court dynamics also play a
role in the media attention a case receives. These ﬁndings show that factors relating
to the internal politics of the Supreme Court such as the ideological direction of the
decision, a declaration of unconstitutionality, the number of justices dissenting, and the
number of separate opinions all increase the chances a case receives front-page coverage
ðMaltzman and Wahlbeck 2003; Sill et al. 2013Þ. These results, combined with evi-
dence that such coverage offers a mechanism for transmitting signals to outside actors
ðBaird 2004Þ, suggest that dissenters have an incentive to use their opinions as tools to
garner media attention.
In sum, we argue that dissenting justices are well positioned to inﬂuence the degree of
conﬂict associated with a case—a key indicator of “newsworthiness.” By using their
autonomy over opinion language, dissenters can attract media attention to a case, which
in turn broadcasts their policy preferences and signals important outside actors such as
potential litigants, Congress, and so forth. Though media coverage of a case may not
contain the nuances of a dissenting opinion, particularly information that may be useful
to potential litigants, those interested in pursuing future litigation in this area, as well
as other stakeholders, would certainly read the full opinions as they contemplate their
strategies. By drawing attention to the case and their dissenting opinion, media coverage
can facilitate dissenters’ broadest goal of inﬂuencing public policy. We expect that
negative language can be employed in dissenting opinions to achieve this goal. More
speciﬁcally, we make the following hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS: As the negativity of the language used in the dissent increases, media
attention to a case should increase.
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While testing the conditions under which justices invoke negative language in
dissenting opinions is beyond the scope of this study, we believe justices deploy such
language strategically not only because it can work to their advantage but also because
there are costs associated with doing so carelessly or excessively. First, frequent overly
negative opinions might make the justices appear capricious and emotional rather than
professional and objective, thereby damaging the Court’s institutional legitimacy. Second,
for an institution with norms of collegiality and privacy ðe.g., Epstein and Knight 1998;
Maltzman, Spriggs, and Wahlbeck 2000Þ, repeated negative dissenting opinions could
decrease other justices’ respect for and willingness to compromise with the offending
justice in future opinion negotiations. Justices rely on respect from their colleagues in an
institution where small-group interpersonal dynamics reign supreme; overt criticism of
their colleagues could harm these important relationships. Finally, persistently using
negative words in dissenting opinions runs the risk of diminishing returns and could lead
to a justice being perceived as “the boy who cried wolf.” Overusing such a tactic would
make the action less notable and newsworthy, limiting its effectiveness.
For the reasons aforementioned, we believe that justices choose opinion language
strategically, but we note that regardless of what leads to highly negative dissents, our
analysis provides important insights into the factors that inﬂuence the visibility of Su-
preme Court decisions. Such information is essential to fully understanding the impact
of the High Court’s decisions on a wide variety of audiences, including government
actors, political elites, potential litigants, and the public. To test the application of the
theoretical account we have proposed, we investigate whether negative dissenting lan-
guage successfully garners media attention.
MEASURING EMOTIVE CONTENT
In order to test our argument, we begin with an analysis of each individual dissent from
1955 to 2008. To measure negativity of opinions we rely on Linguistic Inquiry andWord
Count ðLIWC; see Tausczik and Pennebaker 2010Þ, a text analysis software program that
reads individual text ﬁles and categorizes the proportion of words in the ﬁle on various
dimensions, including, most importantly for our purposes, affect and negativity. While
several dictionaries exist to evaluate the emotive content of texts ðe.g., the Dictionary of
Affect in Language ½DAL; Whissell 2009Þ, we rely on LIWC because of its demonstrated
internal and external validity ðsee, e.g., Pennebaker and King 1999; Tausczik and
Pennebaker 2010; Frimera et al. 2015Þ.3 For example, Kahn et al. ð2007Þ ﬁnd that
LIWC’s negative words are more commonly associated with negative events, and Alpers
et al. ð2005Þ ﬁnd that the dictionary’s negative words correlate strongly with human
ratings of writing excerpts. LIWC has been used in research across the social sciences from
3. For more information on the development of the dictionaries used in LIWC, its external
validity, and base rates of word usage, see http://www.liwc.net/howliwcworks.php.
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psychology ðe.g., Niederhoffer and Pennebaker 2009Þ to sociology ðe.g., Bell, McCarthy,
and McNamara, n.d.Þ to judicial politics ðCorley and Wedeking 2014Þ.4
Some examples of negative words, according to LIWC, include agitating, awful, bad,
careless, ignorant, and ridiculous. The appendix includes a full list of words the dictionary
categorizes as negative. Several of the words LIWC includes in its dictionary are also legal
terms of art that, when used in a Supreme Court opinion, are likely not meant to be
negative as we describe it. Thus we exclude the words abuse*, advers*, aggravate*, argu*,
assault*, bastard, burden*, complain*, exhaust*, guilt*, pett*, prejudice*, victim*, and
violent*.We also excluded a list of profanities, or near-profanities, that might make it into
the facts of the case but are highly unlikely to have been used by the justices. These words
are Argu*, Bitch*, Crap*, Fuck*, Goddam*, Hell, Liar*, Lie, Lied, Lies, Jerk, Jerked,
Jerks, Piss, Puk*, Rape*, Screw*, Shit*, Suck, Sucked, Sucking, and Sucks. LIWC’s list is
also slightly underinclusive of words that are often meant as affectively negative in the
legal domain but are rarely used in the common vernacular. Thus we also adjust the
dictionary to include the words unprincipled, spurious, facile, utterly ½disregards, and I
dissent ðas opposed to “I respectfully dissent”Þ.5 We use LIWC to create the independent
variable of interest in the model: the percentage of words that are negative in each
individual dissent. Thus, the variable accounts for the length of the dissent.
As an initial validation of our measure of negativity, ﬁgure 1 depicts the top 20 most
commonly used negative words in dissents. By far the most common is the word “doubt,”
making up nearly 7% of all negative words captured by LIWC. However, the ﬁgure
indicates that a wide variety of negative words are used in dissenting opinions. Other very
common words include difﬁcult, gross, reject, fear, critical, bad, defeatðingÞ, severe, and
disagree. While not as boisterous or attention grabbing as some of Scalia’s language in the
ACA and same-sex marriage dissents, these words are ones we would often expect to be
associated with blunt statements of disagreement. Further, they signal that the negative
tone of these dissents is rooted in words determined to carry negative affect in a broad
context, not just a judicial one. Thus, the well-established external validity of the LIWC
dictionary gives us conﬁdence in employing it over an unproven alternative.
MODELING MEDIA COVERAGE OF SUPREME COURT CASES
To test our theory that emotional language in dissenting opinions increases a case’s cov-
erage by the media, we want to guard against the possibility that it is the mere existence
4. We note that our results are substantively the same using the “very unpleasant words” dictionary
developed by Whissell ð2009Þ. Given that these two dictionaries dominate the literature on com-
putational sentiment analysis, we feel fairly conﬁdent in concluding that our results are not driven by
the idiosyncrasies of a particular dictionary choice and that our measure is a strong proxy for negativity.
It is also useful to note that there are measures of dissent negativity ðr5 .47; p < .001Þ between LIWC
and DAL. The results of the analysis we present below using DAL can be found in app. table A1.
5. While we believe that these adjustments to the dictionary vastly increase its face validity for our
project, we note that our results are robust to using the LIWC negativity dictionary unaltered. See app.
table A2.
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of a dissent, rather than the content of that dissent, that drives media attention. To do so,
we use a Heckman selection model to ﬁrst account for whether a given case has a dis-
senting opinion and then model the degree of media attention paid to the case ðHeck-
man 1976Þ. The dependent variable in the selection stage is a dichotomous variable in-
dicating whether a case has at least one dissenting opinion. In this ﬁrst-stage selection
equation we also include a set of independent variables that might make a justice on the
Court more likely to dissent, such as whether the case involved either a First Amendment
issue or a civil rights issue, whether the Court’s majority opinion declared a piece of federal
or state legislation unconstitutional, and whether the majority opinion formally altered a
past precedent. We obtained all of these variables using the Supreme Court Database.6
We further include two variables that might inﬂuence the possibility that a dissent is
present ðthe selection stageÞ but is unlikely to inﬂuence the extent of the media coverage
given to any case ðthe outcome stageÞ. First, we argue that justices who are on the bench
together longer are more likely to issue dissents, because the “honeymoon period” of
collegiality wears off the more justices interact with, and can trust the collegiality of, their
colleagues. Thus we include a variable that measures the number of years since a new
member of the Court has joined. Second, we believe that ideological disagreement, in
general, should increase the probability of a dissent. In other words, the more
6. The Supreme Court Database, version 2014, release 01, was compiled by Harold J. Spaeth, Lee
Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Jeffrey A. Segal, Theodore J. Ruger, and Sara C. Benesh ðhttp://scdb
.wustl.edu/index.phpÞ.
Figure 1. Top 20 most frequently used negative words in the dissenting opinions in our
analysis represented by the proportion of all negative words in our analysis. An asterisk
indicates that words are stemmed to include multiple endings.
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ideologically diverse the Court becomes, the more likely it is that justices will disagree
and, thus, dissent. Therefore, we include a variable in the selection stage for the
ideological heterogeneity of the Court, which we measure using the interquartile range
of the justices’ yearly scores ðMartin and Quinn 2002Þ.7
The dependent variable for the outcome stage captures the level of media attention a
case receives. Speciﬁcally, we employ a measure constructed by Collins and Cooper
ð2012Þ that examines coverage of Supreme Court decisions throughout four major
newspapers, the New York Times, Washington Post, Chicago Tribune, and L.A. Times, as
our dependent variable. For each paper the Collins and Cooper index records a 2 if a case
is covered on the front page. An occurrence of coverage outside the front page is scored as
1, and no coverage in a given paper is scored as 0. The scores for a case’s coverage in each
newspaper are then summed to form the salience index, with a maximum score of 8.8
In the model of media attention paid to a case, our primary variable of interest is the
negativity of the dissent. Recall that this variable is the percentage of words in the dissent
that are negative, as coded by LIWC. However, this measure has two limitations that
warrant further discussion. First, the unit of analysis in the model is the case. We argue
that more negativity in the dissent raises the newsworthiness of the entire case, not just
the dissent. However, there are cases in which more than one dissent is ﬁled. In these
cases, we use the average negativity across the dissents. While not a perfect solution, we
argue that not only will a particularly negative dissent be noticed even when multiple dis-
sents are ﬁled but also that it is likely that similar strategic considerations face all dissent-
ing justices within a given case. Thus, the media probably consider the content of the
dissents in the aggregate when deciding the newsworthiness of the case.9
In evaluating whether negative dissents increase the likelihood a case appears in the
four major newspapers, we must also consider the primary factor the literature argues
determines news coverage: attributes of Supreme Court decisions. Recent work examin-
ing media coverage of the Supreme Court argues that journalists watch for certain
characteristics of cases as indicators of whether a decision should be reported prominently
ðSill et al. 2013Þ. Since the Court itself does not directly say whether one case is more
important than another, reporters must make this determination on the basis of other
7. Note that our results are robust if we instead use the standard deviation of the justices’
scores. See app. table A3.
8. This more nuanced measure allows us to account for some of the objections lodged against
the Epstein and Segal ð2000Þ measure of media coverage ðsee Maltzman and Wahlbeck 2003; Collins
and Cooper 2012; Sill et al. 2013Þ as well as get a more complete picture of the levels of media
coverage an individual case can garner. We note that we are not interested in salience as a latent
construct, as many of these works are, and thus are agnostic to the debate about whether case salience
is best measured using media-based approaches ðsee, e.g., Clark, Lax, and Rice 2015Þ or actor-based
observational data ðsee Black, Sorenson, and Johnson 2013Þ.
9. We note in the appendix, however, that our results are also robust to using the most negative
dissent to construct this variable rather than an average of the negativity of the dissents. See table A4.
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grounds. Like others ðe.g., Larson 1985; Slotnick and Segal 1998Þ, Sill et al.ﬁnd that there
are case-level cues that identify the most salient and newsworthy decisions, including the
participants in the case, the issue area dealt with in the case, and the origin of the case.
More speciﬁcally, they ﬁnd that a case is more likely to make the front page of the New
York Times when the case deals with the First Amendment or civil rights. These factors are
thought to signal the media that a particular case will have a signiﬁcant impact on public
policy and is therefore newsworthy. For example, certain issue areas and the involvement
of the federal government are thought to indicate a more impactful decision, according
to Sill et al. Further, evidence suggests that factors tied to the Court’s internal dynamics
and politics also help land a case on the front page. When the Court strikes down a law
as unconstitutional ðSill et al. 2013Þ or alters precedent ðMaltzman andWahlbeck 2003Þ,
a case is more likely to be covered prominently. On the basis of these ﬁndings, we include
a series of controls in our analysis.
First, we include dummy variables for whether a case originated in a court local to any
of the newspapers in the index ðmore speciﬁcally, we include one single dummy if the case
originated in any court in New York, Washington, DC, Illinois, or CaliforniaÞ, whether
the case implicated a First Amendment or civil rights issue ðfrom the Supreme Court
Database issue areasÞ,10 whether the chief justice authored either a majority or dissenting
opinion, and whether the Court formally exercised judicial review or altered precedent.
Noting the possibility of oversaturation of news on the Court, particularly toward the end
of the Court’s term, when decision announcements are more plentiful, we also control for
the number of cases announced the same day.
Further, we note the possibility that the decision to dissent from the bench might be
an especially strong signal of conﬂict ð Johnson, Black, and Ringsmuth 2009Þ and, as
such, might be driving the coverage of that conﬂict rather than the negative content of the
dissenting opinion itself. To account for this possibility, we also run a model controlling
for oral dissent announcement using data from Johnson et al. ð2009Þ and Duffy and
Lambert ð2010Þ, which span from the 1969 through 2004 terms. However, data
limitations on this variable mean that we lose a substantial amount of data; thus we do
not present the results in our analysis above but note that our results remain unchanged
in the truncated model including this control ðsee table A6Þ.
Following Sill et al. ð2013Þ, we also include a control for whether the Court noted that
one of the factors leading them to grant the case in the ﬁrst place was conﬂict in the lower
court. Sill et al. expected, and we agree, that conﬂict should serve as a signal to the media
that the Court’s hand was more likely to be forced to take the case, rather than the case
being granted because of the importance of the issues implicated. Thus, we expect the
coefﬁcient on this control to be negative.
10. We include dummies for only these two issue areas to be consistent with past literature, but
as app. table A5 elucidates, our results are unchanged by including ﬁxed effects for each of the
Supreme Court database issue areas.
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We also control for the negativity of the majority opinion. In addition to being an
important control for the overall negativity of a case, this variable also helps us to pinpoint
the uniqueness of the voice of a dissenter. One possibility is that some cases are just
naturally more contentious and newsworthy than other cases. If this is true, we would
expect that the majority opinion’s negativity would be as inﬂuential as ðif not more in-
ﬂuential thanÞ the dissent on the media coverage a case receives. However, if the media are
uniquely willing to pick up on ﬁery dissents, our theory suggests that justices in losing
coalitions should be especially incentivized to write them. Further, the negativity of the
majority opinion is especially important because it could inﬂuence the words that are
relevant to the dissent. For example, a case involving a violent crime might naturally lead
to more negative language than a case involving commodities trading. Thus, controlling
for the negativity in the majority opinion helps account for language inherently tied to
the case’s subject matter.
Finally, we control for the predecision coverage of the case. Collins and Cooper’s
measure looks at the coverage of a case only after the decision has been announced,
making it an ideal dependent variable for us, but does not provide an analogous pre-
decision coverage measure. For that, we turn to Clark et al. ð2015Þ. Like Collins and
Cooper, Clark et al. examine coverage of Supreme Court decisions throughout three
major newspapers, the New York Times, Washington Post, and L.A. Times. However, they
examine this coverage using a latent variable model to estimate the approximate “salience”
of a case, capture whether a case is covered by each newspaper, and include a wide array of
coverage ði.e., coverage before oral argument, coverage of oral argument, coverage of cases
pending decision, and coverage of decisions themselvesÞ. Because they include stories
about a case published at all phases of the decision-making process, we can control for
the portion of the case’s “salience” ðas they conceptualize itÞ and media coverage ðas we
conceptualize itÞ that is made up only of predecision ðor “early,” as they call itÞ coverage
of the case.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Recall that our dependent variable in the second stage, media coverage, is continuous, so
we employ a standard Heckman model with a dichotomous dependent variable in the
ﬁrst stage ðwhether there was at least one dissentÞ and a continuous dependent variable in
the second stage. The results of this model are presented in table 1. We note that in the
ﬁrst stage of the model, First Amendment cases and cases that formally alter precedent,
are, in general, more likely to produce at least one dissent. Also, consistent with our
expectations, justices are more likely to dissent the longer they have served together on the
bench and as the current Court becomes more ideologically diverse.
We now turn to the second stage, which models the extent to which the media cover a
Supreme Court decision. We ﬁrst note the signiﬁcance of a number of our controls.
Consistent with past work, we ﬁnd that First Amendment and civil rights cases are more
likely to garner media attention as are cases in which the Court formally alters precedent,
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cases originating out of a local court, and cases in which the chief justice wrote either a
majority or dissenting opinion.
We explore the substantive nature of the effect of our variable of interest, negativity,
on media coverage in ﬁgure 2. The y-axis depicts the predicted media coverage of a case
as the average negativity in the dissents increases. In calculating the predicted probabil-
ities, all other independent variables are held at their median or modal values. The grey-
shaded region indicates the 95% conﬁdence intervals. When there was very little neg-
ativity in the dissent, the model predicts that very little attention will be paid to a case by
news outlets.11 However, as the negativity of the dissents increases, media coverage of a
11. The average media coverage is 2.64. When all variables are held at their means or modes, the
model closely approximates this number at y^ 5 2:72.
Table 1. Heckman Regression of Collins and Cooper Case Salience Measure
Coefﬁcient
Robust Standard
Error
Media coverage ðsecond stageÞ:
Average negativity of dissents .23* .07
Negativity of majority opinion .08 .18
Predecision case coverage 1.22* .10
Conﬂict in lower courts 2.37* .17
Case was of local origin .33* .08
First Amendment case 1.25* .47
Civil rights case .67* .18
Number of cases announced 2.02 .01
Chief wrote a dissent .44* .15
Chief wrote majority opinion .46* .07
Judicial review exercised .46 .42
Court formally altered precedent 1.04* .44
Constant 2.40 1.40
Observations 2,459
Any dissent ðﬁrst stageÞ:
First Amendment case .34* .14
Civil rights case .01 .14
Judicial review exercised 2.16 .17
Court formally altered precedent .51* .13
Ideological heterogeneity .13* .04
Years of joint service .06* .02
Constant 2.63* .14
Observations 5,864
Transformed rho .09 .69
Ln j .67* .04
Pseudo log likelihood 29,054.28
Note.—Coefﬁcients and standard errors have been rounded to the nearest hundredth.
Robust standard errors are clustered on issue area.
* p < .05 ðtwo-tailed testÞ.
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case increases substantially. At the maximum level of negativity a case receives nearly
53.2% more media attention than if the Court had issued a very blasé dissent. It is
especially important to note that the predicted values we present in ﬁgure 2 are con-
ditional on a dissent being present. In other words, this effect is above and beyond any
attention that a justice might draw from writing any dissent.
Note also from table 1 that the coefﬁcient on majority negativity is not statistically
signiﬁcant. This indicates that if the media are affected by language at all, they are picking
up on the conﬂictual nature of the dissent. In short, these results validate the assumption
justices have to implicitly make in our broader theoretical argument: ﬁery dissents are no-
ticed, and dissenting justices who use powerful language in their opinions are rewarded
with increased media attention.
Justice William Brennan apocryphally quipped that the only number that mattered
on the Supreme Court was the number ﬁve. With ﬁve votes, he supposedly would tell his
clerks, a justice could change the world. When justices fall short of those ﬁve votes, they
have few avenues available to them for recourse. However, one common intuition is that
by dissenting, such an opinion may serve as the backbone of future majority decisions for
a later Supreme Court to adopt, as Justice Stevens’s and Justice Blackmun’s dissents did in
Bowers. We argue here that this intuition is not entirely without merit. Our results suggest
that by using negative language in their dissents, justices can increase media coverage of
Figure 2. Predicted media coverage of a case as negativity of dissent increases. Grey-
shaded region indicates 95% confidence intervals.
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the cases before them and, according to Baird ð2004Þ, encourage further litigation on
those issues. Though such action may only rarely lead to the outright overturning of the
majority’s decision ðScalia 1994Þ, dissenters may succeed in inﬂuencing how the law
develops in a particular area by signaling those outside the Court such as potential
litigants, lower court judges, governmental actors, and the public ðe.g., Peterson 1981;
Brennan 1986; Wahlbeck et al. 1999; Ginsburg 2010Þ.
While our ﬁnding that negative dissents increase newspaper coverage of a case re-
inforces the conventional wisdom that conﬂict enhances the newsworthiness of an event,
we advance this literature in an important way. The results show that individual justices
are in a position to inﬂuence media coverage of a case. Dissenting opinion authors in par-
ticular, since they do not require the approval of other justices, can express their discontent
with the majority’s position through whatever language they choose. By strategically em-
ploying negative language, dissenting opinion authors are able to single-handedly inﬂu-
ence the media’s perception of a case and thereby the attention it receives. This ﬁnding
provides insight into the occurrence of vigorous, negative dissents such as Scalia’s, Ste-
vens’s, and others’ noted earlier. Since prominent coverage in the news has been shown
to convey cues to potential litigants and promote further litigation on a given issue ðBaird
2004Þ, our results suggest that dissenters, while disadvantaged compared to those in the
majority, are not powerless to affect legal policy.We again note, however, that regardless of
what generated highly negative dissents, the above ﬁndings further our knowledge of the
factors that inﬂuence the visibility of Supreme Court decisions. Such information is es-
sential to fully understanding the effects of Court decisions for a wide variety of audiences,
including government actors, political elites, potential litigants, and the public.
The substantive interpretation of our results, however, comes with an important
caveat. While they indicate that justices understand that by highlighting the conﬂict sur-
rounding a decision ﬁery dissents are noticed and can attract media attention, it is less
clear if increased media attention will always beneﬁt dissenters. If media attention fuels
future litigation in this area, could these negative dissents do more harm than good by
inadvertently helping to perpetuate a legal rule of which the dissenter disapproves? While
this possibility falls outside the scope of our inquiry, justices have little chance of ever
affecting legal policy if the case they lost does not garner initial attention. In other words,
dissenting justices would not have the opportunity to ever see a reversal of legal policy by
the Court if cases on the same issue are never petitioned to be heard in the future. Thus,
while a risky strategy, signaling for additional litigation is often the only strategy available
to dissenters. Moreover, dissenters attempting to increase media coverage of a case are
not necessarily speaking to the contemporary Court or the existing political landscape.
Rather, they may be writing for a time that has not yet come—to a future, and therefore
unknown, political environment. We are not directly arguing, nor can we show, that
justices are using, or should use, their opinions to further immediate policy goals. Rather
we demonstrate that justices can draw attention to the issue, which may leave the door
open for more favorable policy developments in the long run.
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Of course, our study is not without its limitations. Chieﬂy, the phenomenon we
investigate is part of a complicated multistep process involving a number of actors. Jus-
tices must decide whether and how to dissent; media elites respond with the decision
to cover a case and whether to write about a separate opinion. While our results suggest
that dissenting justices attempt to garner media attention through negative language and
that media respond to this effort, they present only an initial indication. Our models
likely oversimplify a much more complicated process. Our measure of media attention,
for example, does not capture whether the media report on the dissenting opinion, nor
does it include any substantive information about how a case is covered. At a minimum,
though, the results suggest that addressing these and other issues related to how dissenting
justices use the tools available to them to inﬂuence policy would be a fruitful line of
inquiry.
These limitations aside, our results are some of the ﬁrst to empirically suggest that
dissents are more than mere jeremiads listing grievances against the majority opinion.
Rather, dissents can serve the important function of drawing attention to a distasteful case
outcome, and if Baird ð2004Þ is right, this attention can keep an issue in the legal
forefront, allowing dissenters ðor those who agree with themÞ to perhaps one day have an
opportunity to walk through the door left ajar by vigorous dissenting opinions. In short,
powerful dissents may be one of the only ways a minority justice may increase the like-
lihood she will some day see her preferences etched into law.
APPENDIX
Negative Words
LIWC’s complete list of negative words includes the following. Note that words in italics
are those we exclude from the dictionary employed in our analysis because they are legal
terms of art, and boldfaced words are those we added for the same reason. An asterisk
means that LIWC searches for stems of words, meaning that, for example, the words dis-
appoint, disappointing, and disappointed would all be found and categorized as negative.
abandon*, abuse*, abusive, ache*, aching, advers*, afraid, aggravat*, aggress*, agitat*,
agony, alarm*, alone, anger*, angr*, anguish*, annoy*, antagoni*, anxi*, appall*, appre-
hens*, argu*, arrogan*, asham*, assault*, aversi*, avoid*, awful, bad, bastard, beaten,
bewilder*, bitch*, bitter*, blam*, bore*, boring, bother*, burden*, careless*, cheat*,
complain*, confus*, contradic*, crap*, craz*, cried, cries, critical, critici*, cruel*, crushed,
cry, crying, cut, cynical, damn*, danger*, daze*, decay*, defeat*, defect*, defens*, degrad*,
depress*, depriv*, despair*, desperate*, despis*, destroy*, destruct*, devastat*, devil*,
difﬁcult*, disagree*, disappoint*, disaster*, [I] dissent, discomfort*, discourag*, disgust*,
dislike, disliked, dislikes, dismay*, distraught, distress*, distrust*, disturb*, dominate*,
doom*, doubt*, dread*, dull*, dumb*, dump*, dwell*, egotis*, embarass*, emotional,
empt*, enem*, enrag*, envious, envy, evil, excruciat*, exhaust*, facile, fail*, fatal, fatigu*,
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fear, feared, fearing, fears, feud*, ﬁght, ﬁghting, ﬁghts, ﬂop*, ﬂunk*, forbid*, fought,
frantic*, freak*, fright*, frustrat*, fuck*, furious*, gloom*, goddam*, gossip*, grave*,
greed*, grief, griev*, grim*, grind, gross*, guilt*, harass*, hate, hated, hateful, hates,
hating, hatred, hazy, hell, helpless*, hesitant, homesick*, hopeless*, horribl*, horrif*,
horror, hostil*, humiliat*, hurt*, ignoran*, impatien*, impersonal, inadequate, indiffer-
en*, ineffect*, inferior, inhib*, insecur*, insult*, interrup*, intimidat*, irrational, irrita*,
isolat*, jealous*, jerk, jerked, jerks, kill*, lame, liar*, lie, lied, lies, loneli*, lonely, lonesome,
longing, lose, loser*, losing, loss*, lost, lous*, low*, ludicrous*, mad, mess, messy, miser*,
miss, missed, misses, missing, molest*, moody, mourn*, nag*, nast*, neglect*, nervous*,
numb, obnoxious*, obsess*, offend*, outrag*, overwhelm*, pain, painf*, painl*, pains,
panic*, paranoi*, pathetic*, peculiar*, pervert*, pessimis*, petrif*, pett*, piss*, pitiful*,
pity, poison*, prejudic*, pressur*, protest, protested, protesting, puk*, punish*, rage*,
rape*, rebel*, regret*, reject*, reluctan*, remorse*, repress*, resent*, resign*, restless*,
revenge*, ridicul*, rigid*, rude*, ruin*, sad, sarcas*, scare*, scream*, screw*, selﬁsh*,
serious*, severe*, shak*, shame*, shit*, shock*, shy*, sicken*, silly, sin, sinister, sins,
skeptical, smother*, snob*, sorrow*, sorry, spite*, startl*, strain*, strange, stress*, stub-
born*, stunned, stuns, stupid, suck, sucked, sucking, sucks, suffer, suffered, suffering,
suffers, suspicious*, tear*, teas*, temper, tense*, tension*, terribl*, terriﬁed*, terrifying,
terror*, threaten*, tick, ticked, torture*, tragedy, tragic, trembl*, trick*, troubl*, turmoil,
ugh, ugly, unattractive, uncertain, uncomfortable, uneas*, unfortunate*, unhapp*, unim-
portant, unpleasant, unprincipled, unprotected, unsuccessful, unsure*, upset*, useless,
utterly [disregards], vain, vanity, vicious*, victim*, violent*, vulnerab*, weak*, weep*,
weird*, whine*, wicked*, worr*, worse*, worthless, wrong*.
Robustness Checks
Below are tables for the various robustness checks described in the text of the article.
Table A1. Heckman Regression of Collins and Cooper Case Salience Measure Using
Dictionary of Affect in Language
Coefﬁcient
Robust Standard
Error
Media coverage ðsecond stageÞ:
Average negativity of dissents .08* .03
Negativity of majority opinion 2.05 .04
Predecision case coverage 1.11* .14
Conﬂict in lower courts 2.39* .17
Case was of local origin .33* .08
First Amendment case 1.22* .28
Civil rights case .69* .18
Number of cases announced 2.03* .01
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Table A1 (Continued )
Coefﬁcient
Robust Standard
Error
Chief wrote a dissent .45* .16
Chief wrote majority opinion .46* .07
Judicial review exercised .47 .35
Court formally altered precedent .98* .32
Constant 2.61* .63
Observations 2,456
Any dissent ðﬁrst stageÞ:
First Amendment case .34* .14
Civil rights case .01 .14
Judicial review exercised 2.16 .17
Court formally altered precedent .51* .13
Ideological heterogeneity .13* .03
Years of joint service .05* .01
Constant 2.62* .15
Observations 5,861
Transformed rho .02 .23
Ln j .66* .03
Pseudo log likelihood 29,048.41
Note.—Robust standard errors are clustered on issue area. Coefﬁcients and standard errors have
been rounded to the nearest hundredth.
* p < .05 ðtwo-tailed testÞ.
Table A2. Heckman Regression of Collins and Cooper Case Salience Measure Using
Full, Unedited LIWC Dictionary
Coefﬁcient
Robust Standard
Error
Media coverage ðsecond stageÞ:
Average negativity of dissents .20* .05
Negativity of majority opinion 2.06 .07
Predecision case coverage 1.22* .10
Conﬂict in lower courts 2.38* .18
Case was of local origin .33* .07
First Amendment case 1.25* .33
Civil rights case .70* .18
Number of cases announced 2.02* .01
Chief wrote a dissent .43* .16
Chief wrote majority opinion .46* .07
Judicial review exercised .47 .37
Court formally altered precedent 1.03* .35
Constant 2.50* .82
Observations 2,456
Any dissent ðﬁrst stageÞ:
First Amendment case .34* .14
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Table A2 (Continued )
Coefﬁcient
Robust Standard
Error
Civil rights case .01 .14
Judicial review exercised 2.16 .17
Court formally altered precedent .51* .13
Ideological heterogeneity .13* .03
Years of joint service .05* .02
Constant 2.62* .14
Observations 5,861
Transformed rho .05 .35
Ln j .66* .03
Pseudo log likelihood 29,045.11
Note.—Coefﬁcients and standard errors have been rounded to the nearest hundredth. Robust
standard errors are clustered on issue area.
* p < .05 ðtwo-tailed testÞ.
Table A3. Heckman Regression of Collins and Cooper Case Salience Measure Using
Martin-Quinn Scores
Coefﬁcient
Robust Standard
Error
Media coverage ðsecond stageÞ:
Average negativity of dissents .20* .08
Negativity of majority opinion .07 .17
Predecision case coverage 1.16* .11
Conﬂict in lower courts 2.34* .14
Case was of local origin .34* .08
First Amendment case 1.80* .46
Civil rights case .60 .39
Number of cases announced 2.03* .01
Chief wrote a dissent .44* .13
Chief wrote majority opinion .40* .08
Judicial review exercised .08 .59
Court formally altered precedent 1.74* .39
Constant .23 .58
Observations 2,459
Any dissent ðﬁrst stageÞ:
First Amendment case .31* .14
Civil rights case .02 .14
Judicial review exercised 2.15 .17
Court formally altered precedent .49* .13
Ideological heterogeneity ðSDÞ .43* .07
Years of joint service .03* .01
Constant 21.23* .15
Observations 5,864
Transformed rho 1.47* .24
179
This content downloaded from 131.204.175.051 on March 09, 2017 06:50:35 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Table A3 (Continued )
Coefﬁcient
Robust Standard
Error
Ln j 1.05* .06
Pseudo log likelihood 28,965.28
Note.—The table uses the standard deviation of Martin-Quinn ð2002Þ scores rather than inter-
quartile range to measure ideological heterogeneity. Robust standard errors are clustered on issue area.
Coefﬁcients and standard errors have been rounded to the nearest hundredth.
* p < .05 ðtwo-tailed testÞ.
Table A4. Heckman Regression of Collins and Cooper Case Salience Measure Using
Mean and Maximum Dissent Negativity
Mean
Negativity
Maximum
Negativity
Media coverage ðsecond stageÞ:
Negativity of dissents .23* .28*
ð.07Þ ð.06Þ
Negativity of majority opinion .08 .04
ð.18Þ ð.17Þ
Predecision case coverage 1.22* 1.21*
ð.10Þ ð.09Þ
Conﬂict in lower courts 2.37* 2.37*
ð.17Þ ð.17Þ
Case was of local origin .33* .34*
ð.08Þ ð.08Þ
First Amendment case 1.25* 1.24*
ð.47Þ ð.41Þ
Civil rights case .67* .67*
ð.18Þ ð.17Þ
Number of cases announced 2.02 2.02
ð.01Þ ð.01Þ
Chief wrote a dissent .44* .42*
ð.15Þ ð.16Þ
Chief wrote majority opinion .46* .46*
ð.07Þ ð.16Þ
Judicial review exercised .46 .45
ð.42Þ ð.40Þ
Court formally altered precedent 1.04* 1.02*
ð.44Þ ð.38Þ
Constant 2.40 2.39*
ð1.40Þ ð1.15Þ
Observations 2,459 2,459
Any dissent ðﬁrst stageÞ:
First Amendment case .34* .34*
ð.14Þ ð.14Þ
Civil rights case .01 .01
ð.14Þ ð.14Þ
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Table A4 (Continued )
Mean
Negativity
Maximum
Negativity
Judicial review exercised 2.16 2.16
ð.17Þ ð.17Þ
Court formally altered precedent .51* .51*
ð.13Þ ð.13Þ
Ideological heterogeneity .13* .13*
ð.04Þ ð.03Þ
Years of joint service .06* .06*
ð.02Þ ð.02Þ
Constant 2.63* 2.63*
ð.14Þ ð.14Þ
Observations 5,864 5,864
Transformed rho .09 .08
ð.69Þ ð.55Þ
Ln j .67* .66*
ð.04Þ ð.04Þ
Log likelihood 29,054.28 29,051.56
Note.—Means are taken from the text of the paper. Coefﬁcients and standard errors have been
rounded to the nearest hundredth. Robust standard errors, clustered on issue area, are reported in
parentheses.
* p < 0.5 ðtwo-tailed testÞ.
Table A5. Heckman Regression of Collins and Cooper Case Salience Measure Using
Fixed Effects for Each Issue Area
Coefﬁcient
Robust Standard
Error
Media coverage ðsecond stageÞ:
Average negativity of dissents .19* .09
Negativity of majority opinion 2.01 .11
Predecision case coverage 1.09* .07
Conﬂict in lower courts 2.31* .08
Case was of local origin .30* .08
Number of cases announced 2.03* .01
Chief wrote a dissent .42* .16
Chief wrote majority opinion .37* .13
Judicial review exercised .01 .28
Court formally altered precedent 1.66* .33
Criminal procedure Omitted
Civil rights .38* .16
First Amendment 1.68* .20
Due process 2.49* .19
Privacy 1.61* .38
Attorneys 2.45 .32
Unions 2.19 .16
181
This content downloaded from 131.204.175.051 on March 09, 2017 06:50:35 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Table A5 (Continued )
Coefﬁcient
Robust Standard
Error
Economic activity 2.35* .11
Judicial power 2.76* .13
Federalism .21 .20
Taxation 2.55* .16
Miscellaneous 21.02 .65
Constant .38 .22
Observations 2,459
Any dissent ðﬁrst stageÞ:
First Amendment case .33* .07
Civil rights case .06 .05
Judicial review exercised 2.13 .08
Court formally altered precedent .52* .12
Ideological heterogeneity .03 .02
Years of joint service .04* .01
Constant 2.41* .05
Observations 5,864
Transformed rho 1.57* .13
Ln j 1.07* .04
Pseudo log likelihood 28,990.24
Note.—Robust standard errors are unclustered. Coefﬁcients and standard errors have been rounded
to the nearest hundredth.
* p < .05 ðtwo-tailed testÞ.
Table A6. Heckman Regression of Collins and Cooper Case Salience Measure
Including Oral Dissents
Coefﬁcient
Robust Standard
Error
Media coverage ðsecond stageÞ:
Average negativity of dissents .24* .08
Negativity of majority opinion 2.15 .19
Predecision case coverage .86* .08
Conﬂict in lower courts 2.26 .15
Case was of local origin .32* .09
First Amendment case 2.10* .52
Civil rights case .58 .46
Number of cases announced 2.02* .01
Chief wrote a dissent .60* .21
Chief wrote majority opinion .34* .08
Judicial review exercised 2.44 .61
Court formally altered precedent 1.92* .48
Oral dissent from the bench 1.40* .35
Constant 2.52 .68
Observations 1,959
This content downloaded from 131.204.175.051 on March 09, 2017 06:50:35 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Table A6 (Continued )
Coefﬁcient
Robust Standard
Error
Any dissent ðﬁrst stageÞ:
First Amendment case .35* .15
Civil rights case .08 .15
Judicial review exercised 2.27 .21
Court formally altered precedent .53* .09
Ideological heterogeneity 2.01 .02
Years of joint service .04* .01
Constant 2.46* .14
Observations 5,364
Transformed rho 1.78* .23
Ln j 1.16* .06
Pseudo log likelihood 27,512.13
Note.—The table includes a variable indicating whether at least one justice orally dissented from the
bench. Robust standard errors are clustered on issue area. Coefﬁcients and standard errors have been
rounded to the nearest hundredth.
* p < .05 ðtwo-tailed testÞ.
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